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“HEY, HEY! HO, HO! THESE MASS ARRESTS HAVE GOT TO
GO!”: THE EXPRESSIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT

KAREN J. PITA LOOR*
ABSTRACT
The racial justice protests ignited by the murder of George Floyd
in May 2020 constitute the largest protest movement in the United
States. Estimates suggest that between fifteen and twenty-six million
people protested across the country during the summer of 2020 alone.
Not only were the number of protestors staggering, but so were the
number of arrests. Within one week of when the video of George
Floyd’s murder went viral, police arrested ten thousand people demanding justice on American streets, with police often arresting
activists en masse. This Essay explores mass arrests and how they
square with Fourth Amendment protections, as conceived by its
Framers. The first part of this Essay provides an account of mass
arrests during the George Floyd protests in Los Angeles, the city with
the largest number of reported arrests in the initial demonstrations.
The second part of this Essay begins by briefly reviewing the Expressive Fourth Amendment, a doctrine the author previously introduced,
which posits that the Framers designed the Fourth Amendment to
protect freedom of expression, in addition to the prevailing understanding of its safeguard of bodily integrity. The Expressive Fourth
Amendment shields from government overreach individuals engaged
in political expressive conduct. Here, this Essay expands upon this
doctrine by querying how this protection should apply to mass arrests during protests and ultimately concludes that courts should
demand both that a police officer establish probable cause for each
protester swept up in a mass arrest and that judges positively weigh
an individual’s expressive conduct when determining whether an
arrest was reasonable in the totality of the circumstances.
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. My sincerest
gratitude to the student organizers of the William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and
Social Justice Symposium, The Largest Social Movement: Legal Lessons from the Black
Lives Matter Movement, for their invitation to participate in this special issue. I am
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this project. Thank you also to Naomi Mann for her support and helpful conversations
about this Essay. I am thankful to Sri Ravipati, Christiana Prater-Lee, and Robert Wirtz
for their invaluable research assistance. I am indebted to Penélope P. Zambrana and
Joseph E. Staska for their patience and support.
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INTRODUCTION
As this Special Issue of the William & Mary Journal of Race,
Gender, and Social Justice recognizes, the racial justice protests
ignited by the murder of George Floyd in May 2020 constitute the
largest protest movement in the United States.1 Estimates suggest
that between fifteen and twenty-six million people protested across
the country during the summer of 2020 alone.2 Not only were the
number of protestors staggering, but so were the number of arrests.3
Within one week of when the video of George Floyd’s murder went
viral, police arrested 10,000 people demanding justice on American
streets, with police often arresting activists en masse.4 This Essay
explores mass arrests and how they square with Fourth Amendment
protections, as conceived by its Framers.
The first part of this Essay provides an account of mass arrests
during the George Floyd protests in the City of Los Angeles. I focus
on Los Angeles because it is the city with the largest number of
1. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc
/K48Z-K67L].
2. Id.
3. See Meryl Kornfield, Austin R. Ramsey, Jacob Wallace, Christopher Casey &
Verónica Del Valle, Swept Up by Police, WASH. POST: INVESTIGATIONS (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/investigations/george-floyd-protesters
-arrests [https://perma.cc/KJ7C-3ZLR].
4. Anita Snow, AP Tally: Arrests at Widespread U.S. Protests Hit 10,000, AP NEWS
(June 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/american-protests-us-news-arrests-minnesota
-burglary-bb2404f9b13c8b53b94c73f818f6a0b7#:~:text=PHOENIX%20(AP)%20%E2%80
%94%20More%20than,known%20arrests%20across%20the%20U.S. [https://perma.cc
/5JV8-75TS]. Within two weeks, the number of arrests reached 17,000. Kornfield et al.,
supra note 3.
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reported arrests in the early days of the protests.5 The second part
of this Essay discusses how the doctrine of the Expressive Fourth
Amendment, which I advanced in a prior piece by the same name,6
should apply to mass arrests of individuals engaged in expressive
conduct.7
I. ACCOUNTS OF MASS ARRESTS OF PROTESTERS
The police tactic of using mass arrests against protesters is by no
means unique to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement.8 Police
have used mass arrests against environmental protesters,9 WTO
5. See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, John Eligon & Will Wright, L.A.P.D. Severely
Mishandled George Floyd Protests, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com
/2021/03/11/us/lapd-george-floyd-protests.html [https://perma.cc/K67K-BMJH] (last updated Mar. 29, 2021).
6. Karen Pita Loor, The Expressive Fourth Amendment, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 101
(forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Loor, Expressive Fourth]; Karen Pita Loor, An Argument
Against Unbounded Arrest Power: The Expressive Fourth Amendment & Protesting While
Black, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2022) [hereinafter Loor, Protesting While Black].
7. By conduct, I mean any behavior that leads to the interaction between police and
the policed person, which during protests is expressive activity. The Supreme Court recognizes that conduct “expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act” that is “closely
akin to ‘pure speech’ which . . . is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06
(1969).
8. In 2013, three community organizers, Alicia Garzia, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal
Tometi founded the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) movement through the hashtag,
#BlackLivesMatter, on social media. Herbert G. Ruffin II, Black Lives Matter: The
Growth of a New Social Justice Movement, BLACKPAST (Aug. 23, 2015), https://www.black
past.org/african-american-history/black-lives-matter-growth-new-social-justice-move
ment [https://perma.cc/Y86S-74D8]. This idea came in the wake of the July 2013 acquittal of George Zimmerman for the murder of seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin. Id.
BLM drew inspiration from the 1960s civil rights/Black power movement, the 1980s
Black feminist/womanist movement, the 2000s LGBTQ+ movement, and the 2011
Occupy Wall Street movement. Id. August 9, 2014 marked the first time that BLM
members took to the streets in protest during the BLM Freedom Ride to Ferguson,
Missouri. Id. There, they participated in non-violent protests in the wake of the murder
of eighteen-year-old Michael Brown at the hand of police officer, Darren Wilson. Id. BLM
was one of hundreds of organizations protesting in Ferguson, but they quickly stood out
as the BLM slogan became the call for action against unjustifiable killings of countless
African Americans beyond Michael Brown. Id. By summer of 2015, BLM opened chapters
around the world including in United States, Canada, and Ghana. Id. BLM also began
pressuring politicians to state their stance on BLM issues and to create policies that
would facilitate the improvement of Black communities. Id. Between 2016 and 2020,
BLM continued to protest police abuse and hold anti-racism rallies. Id. Following the
deaths of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd in 2020, the BLM movement became more influential than ever as more than 20 million people in 2,000 cities
and towns in every state in the United States took to the streets in protest. Id.
9. Katharine Gammon, Line 3: Protests Over Pipeline Through Tribal Lands Spark
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protesters,10 pro-immigrant advocates,11 and Occupy,12 just to name
a few incidents in recent years. However, the data demonstrates
that police are more likely to show up in high alert and high force
when the protesters are Black and Brown.13 Although, admittedly
the George Floyd protests have been remarkedly racially diverse,14
to the degree that police perceived these as Black movements, law
enforcement presence was particularly aggressive.15 Furthermore,
it would be naïve to pretend that police conduct is not influenced by
the fact that one of the fundamental tenets of the BLM movement
is a critique of police brutality against Black and Brown people.16
Clashes and Mass Arrests, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/en
vironment/2021/jun/10/line-3-pipeline-arrests-minnesota [https://perma.cc/WTX8-ZY6M].
10. See Karen J. Pita Loor, When Protest Is the Disaster: Constitutional Implications
of State and Local Emergency Power, 43 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2019) (discussing in detail the mass arrests of 1999 WTO protestors).
11. Ed Pilkington, Almost 600 Arrested at Washington Protest Over Trump Immigration Policy, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun
/28/us-immigration-protest-trump-washington-senate [https://perma.cc/9FAU-X9MM].
12. Matt Wells, Occupy Wall Street—The Story of the Brooklyn Bridge “Trap”,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/oct/03/occupy
-wall-street-brooklyn-bridge-arrests [https://perma.cc/CWC4-C3FC].
13. See Gabbatt, infra note 15. I have decided to capitalize “Black” and “Brown” but
not “white” to reflect the shared identity and history of repression among communities
of color. See David Bauder, AP Says It Will Capitalize Black But Not white, AP NEWS
(July 20, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/entertainment-cultures-race-and-ethnicity-us
-news-ap-top-news-7e36c00c5af0436abc09e051261fff1f [https://perma.cc/2JYA-PVSX];
Mike Laws, Why We Capitalize ‘Black’ (and Not ‘white’), COLUM. J. REV. (June 16, 2020),
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/capital-b-black-styleguide.php [https://perma.cc/9M7H
-LC5P]; Nancy Coleman, Why We’re Capitalizing Black, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/05/insider/capitalized-black.html [https://perma.cc/N5P6
-7RFT]; see also Peter Wegner, Capitalize Brown, KQED (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www
.kqed.org/perspectives/201601140174/peter-wegner-capitalize-brown [https://perma.cc
/7G5V-YJ3N] (“Capital B for Black people. Capital B for Brown people. It’s not a revolution, even in the world of typography. It’s incremental, a keystroke’s worth of change.
It costs nothing. It is, literally, the least we can do.”).
14. See LaGina Gause & Maneesh Arora, Not All of Last Year’s Black Lives Matter
Protesters Supported Black Lives Matter, WASH. POST (July 2, 2021), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/01/not-all-last-years-black-lives-matter-protesters
-supported-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/4YUP-ZBJU].
15. Adam Gabbatt, Protests About Police Brutality Are Met with Wave of Police
Brutality Across U.S., GUARDIAN (June 6, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2020/jun/06/police-violence-protests-us-george-floyd [https://perma.cc/UX7V-9N6F]; Shaila
Dewan & Mike Baker, Facing Protests Over Use of Force, Police Respond with More
Force, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/police-tactics
-floyd-protests.html [https://perma.cc/U4PM-V7YT].
16. Since its origin, the BLM movement has expanded to embrace advocacy for other
non-white people. See, e.g., Russell Contreras, How Black Lives Matter Helped Native
Americans and Latinos, AXIOS (Mar. 13, 2021), https://www.axios.com/george-floyd-na
tive-americans-latinos-black-lives-matter-f9943dc3-0b4e-4fea-985e-349fdb9a5473.html
[https://perma.cc/2SXM-C6P6].

2021]

THE EXPRESSIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT

9

Below is an account of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) mass
arrests—the police department with the highest volume of arrests
in the early days of the George Floyd protests.17
LAPD arrested over four thousand people from May 29 to June
2.18 As is common during protests, the overwhelming number of arrests were for non-violent conduct.19 In Los Angeles, the most frequent charges were failure to obey a police order or violating curfew.20
The table below contains arrest statistics from a report, ordered by the
Los Angeles City Council, examining LAPD’s response to the protests:

17. Infra Table 1. The cities trailing behind Los Angeles in the volume of arrests were
Dallas, Philadelphia, and New York City. See Snow, supra note 4. For example, journalist
Jake Bleiberg reported that Dallas police admitted to arresting 696 people on the Margaret
Hunt Hill Bridge in Dallas in a single evening. See Jake Bleiberg (@JZBleiberg), TWITTER
(June 2, 2020, 5:40 PM), https://twitter.com/JZBleiberg/status/1267934206363086848
[https://perma.cc/MT4Z-GFVJ]; see also Nichole Manna & Anna M. Tinsley, Dallas Protesters Spent up to 36 Hours in Jail, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM (June 5, 2020), https://
infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-view?p=WORLDNEWS&docref=news/17
B69B034F4E9FF8&f=basic [https://perma.cc/YE5X-9MYN]. In New York City, 1,969 people
were arrested from May 29 to June 4. N.Y. STATE OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., NEW YORK
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S RESPONSE TO DEMONSTRATIONS FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF
GEORGE FLOYD 13, 18 (2020), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2020-nypd-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FV3T-6AF7]. In Philadelphia, Police Commissioner Danielle Outlaw
confirmed that there were over 700 arrests in the first week of the George Floyd protests.
Anna Orso, They Said His Name, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 7, 2020), https://www.inquirer
.com/news/inq/george-floyd-philadelphia-protest-photos-20200607.html [https://perma.cc
/K74F-KF7D].
18. GERALD CHALEFF, L.A. CITY COUNCIL, AN INDEPENDENT EXAMINATION OF THE LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 2020 POLICE RESPONSE 10 (2021) [hereinafter L.A. CITY
COUNCIL REPORT], http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/041321/BPC_21-067.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X5X8-CAYZ].
19. Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Injunctive Relief at 1,
Black Lives Matter L.A. v. City of L.A., No. 2:20-cv-05027 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2021) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint]; see also Loor, Protesting While Black, supra note 6.
20. L.A. CITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 18, at 10. Failure to obey a police officer
is only an infraction, which should not result in a custodial arrest. See L.A. MUN. CODE
§ 80.02 (1980); L.A. CITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 18, at 9. Yet those arrested were
taken into custody. L.A. CITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 18, at 9; Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 19, at 36. According to pleadings in Black Lives Matter L.A. v.
City of L.A., about a third of the people arrested were charged with an infraction. See
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 31, 36. California Penal Code Section
853.5 mandates that individuals charged with an infraction should be released on their
own recognizance on the field after they agree to appear at a subsequent hearing. Id. at
36. However, police held those accused of infractions in buses for extended periods of
time and even booked them. Id.
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TABLE 1. LAPD ARRESTS AND CHARGES MAY 30 THROUGH JUNE 2, 2020
Date

Number of
arrests

Charges

May 30

866

curfew violation, failure to disperse,
failure to obey a lawful police order,
looting

May 31

700

curfew violation, looting

June 1

1242

curfew violation, failure to obey a
lawful police order, looting

June 221

956

curfew violation22

Although here I will focus on the mass arrest tactics employed
by the LAPD during the protests, there were also numerous accusations of the LAPD’s use of excessive force against protestors, including improper and abusive use of rubber bullets and baton strikes.23
The Los Angeles City Council report was critical of the LAPD’s
response to the protests in this respect as well.24 The LAPD’s overall
mishandling of the protests was so egregious that there were contemporaneous public demands for Police Chief Michel Moore’s
resignation.25
The LAPD’s actions during protests also landed them in court.26
In Black Lives Matter Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, several
protesters brought a class action against the city, the police commissioner, and unnamed officers pursuant to § 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights for unlawful
21. For information regarding arrests from May 30 to June 1, 2020, see L.A. CITY
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 18, at 10.
22. The L.A. City Council Report does not classify for what offenses people were
arrested on June 2, but only that there were 956 arrests. Id. at 23. However, we know
that at least 120 people were arrested together for curfew violations in one area of the
city. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 4, 28.
23. See Order Regarding Plaintiffs’ Application for Temporary Restraining Order at
4, Black Lives Matter L.A. v. City of L.A., No. 2:20-cv-05027 (2020); see also Second
Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 62.
24. See L.A. CITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 18, at 58–64.
25. Nouran Salahieh, Residents Call on LAPD Chief to Resign in L.A. Police Commission’s 1st Meeting Since Protests Started Across the City, KTLA5 (June 2, 2020),
https://ktla.com/news/local-news/l-a-police-commission-holds-1st-meeting-since-protests
-started-across-the-city [https://perma.cc/UN8V-9WTP].
26. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 9–10, 14.
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detention and arrest, as well as for excessive force.27 The lawsuit
recounts how the police employed mass arrest tactics in the days following the murder of George Floyd.28 As the table above demonstrates,
people were arrested routinely for failure to obey a police order or
curfew violations.29 An account of the facts from Black Lives Matter
Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles reveals that LAPD tactics made
it often impossible to comply with curfews and police orders to disperse.30 Rather, police tactics seemed explicitly designed to trap not
only activists, but anyone in the vicinity of the protests.
Curfews were announced at the last minute; information about
curfews was not well disseminated; or curfew times were changed
without advance notice.31 On May 31, LAPD police officers informed,
at about 5:45 PM, 10,000 activists who were out on the streets protesting that a curfew would go into effect at 6:00 PM,32 providing insufficient notice for people to leave the streets. The next day the City
changed the curfew from 6:00 PM to 5:00 PM but waited until 4:00 PM
to issue an announcement.33 LAPD then used a well-known protest
policing technique called “kettling” to prevent protesters from leaving
the protest and complying with the impending curfew order or a dispersal order.34 Police kettle protesters by corralling them and “blocking all exit routes.”35 Here, the LAPD positioned themselves rows
deep, garbed in riot gear and armed with less lethal weapons, to block
any escape.36 One protester described “an impenetrable wall of officers
at least 10 deep.”37 After corralling protesters, police proceeded to
arrest en masse.38 People were rounded up by the hundreds.39
27. Id. at 62–63. Plaintiffs alleged their First Amendment and Due Process rights
were also violated, as well as violations of California state law. Id.
28. Id. at 9–10, 14.
29. See id. at 4.
30. See id. at 23–24, 26.
31. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 3–4; see also Erika Martin,
Glendale Curfew Warning Accidentally Sent to All of L.A. County; Countywide Curfew
Is Still 6 p.m., KTLA5 (June 1, 2020), https://ktla.com/news/local-news/glendale-curfew
-warning-accidentally-sent-to-all-of-l-a-county-countywide-curfew-is-still-6-p-m
[https://perma.cc/K4GV-927H].
32. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 3–4.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 13. In 2007, LAPD agreed to a settlement in Multi-Ethnic Immigrant
Workers Org. Network v. City of L.A. to provide protesters with “a clear and safe route”
to disperse, as well as “an objectively reasonable” time to disperse, after issuing an
audible order to disperse. Id. at 46–47 (quoting Multi-Ethnic Immigrant Workers Org.
Network v. City of L.A., 246 F.R.D. 621 (C.D. Cal. 2007)).
37. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 13.
38. Id. at 12–14, 24, 26, 28, 30. Often, police also fired less lethal weapons at kettled
crowds. See id. at 26.
39. See id. at 25.
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Some protesters were surrounded on all sides by lines of police,
while others were herded into an area where there was no escape.40
Even when there was no curfew and no audible order to disperse,
police still informed crowds that they were going to be arrested; often
the police ordered people to sit down on the ground to wait for arrest
or to kneel with their hands behind their backs.41 Police ignored
individuals’ requests to be allowed to leave and furthermore chased
and fired rubber bullets and other projectiles at people attempting
to escape the area.42 Protesters were not the only ones swept up in
these mass arrests—journalists covering the demonstrations and
others in the area, including homeless people, were also detained
and arrested.43 Once detained by police, individuals had to wait for
prolonged periods on the street—sometimes tightly handcuffed and
sitting on the ground—to be loaded into crowded buses where they
waited again until they were transported and booked, even when
they were ultimately charged with only an infraction.44
In June of 2020, I interviewed Jason Sywak.45 Mr. Sywak participated in the summer 2020 George Floyd protests in Los Angeles.46
His account of police tactics was consistent with those recounted by
plaintiffs in Black Lives Matter Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles.47
According to Mr. Sywak, “riot police” and the National Guard blocked
all streets before the curfew was initiated so people could not leave
and would thus have no choice but to violate the curfew.48 He stated
that before the streets are blocked, buses are parked nearby in anticipation of arrests.49 Police told protesters that they had to leave
and go home, but there was “no way out.”50 In one of these instances,
Mr. Sywak attempted to explain to “riot police” that passing through
the police skirmish line to leave was impractical because his home
was two blocks away in that direction.51 The officer from the “riot
police” raised his gun, aimed it at Mr. Sywak’s head, and commanded

40. Id. at 9, 11–13, 18, 28.
41. Id. at 11, 24, 25, 28.
42. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 14–17.
43. Id. at 1, 14–15.
44. See id. at 5, 10–12, 15, 17, 18, 25 (discussing the supposedly lesser legal implications of infractions).
45. Telephone Interview with Jason Sywak, Protester (June 15, 2020).
46. Id.
47. Compare Telephone Interview with Jason Sywak, Protester, supra note 45, with
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 14–17.
48. Telephone Interview with Jason Sywak, Protester, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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that he leave in the opposite direction.52 As of the date of our interview, Mr. Sywak had successfully evaded arrest during the summer’s
protests.53 He is one of the lucky ones on that front.
II. THE EXPRESSIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS APPLICATION
TO MASS ARRESTS DURING PROTESTS
The current understanding of the Fourth Amendment is inappropriate, and inadequate, to protect activists engaged in expressive
conduct from mass arrests during protests. This understanding is
also inconsistent with the Framers’ intent that the Fourth Amendment protect freedom of expression, in addition to bodily integrity.
I have argued that courts have missed the expressive component of
Fourth Amendment protection when evaluating claims of law enforcement excessive force against protesters.54 Courts should apply
an Expressive Fourth Amendment whenever a policed individual
engages in primarily expressive conduct, as opposed to criminal conduct. Below I first describe how courts currently evaluate a protester’s claim that police officers violated their right to be free from
unreasonable arrest.55 Then, I briefly introduce the Expressive Fourth
Amendment and query how it might change this analysis.
A. The Current Understanding of the Fourth Amendment and
Mass Arrests
The text of the Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against
unreasonable searches and seizures” and states that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”56 Despite this strict warrant requirement
for arrests in the text of the Fourth Amendment, courts have read this
language loosely and have made warrantless arrests the norm—
whether for felonies, misdemeanors, or even criminal infractions
52. Id. Mr. Sywak stated that from May 30 to June 6, police officers pointed a gun at
him on five different occasions. Id.
53. Telephone Interview with Jason Sywak, Protester, supra note 45.
54. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6.
55. I use “they/them” pronouns throughout this Essay to be inclusive of all gender
identities. See Jacob Tobia, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Gender-Neutral
Pronouns, TIME (May 12, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://time.com/4327915/gender-neutral
-pronouns; 2015 Word of Year is Singular “They”, AM. DIALECT SOC’Y (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://www.americandialect.org/2015-word-of-the-year-is-singular-they [https://perma
.cc/TN3Z-GW6Q].
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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that are not punishable with incarceration.57 I will leave for another
day the question of whether it comports with the Expressive Fourth
Amendment for warrantless arrests to be the norm for people primarily engaged in expressive conduct. Here, I narrow my analysis
to the pervasive protest policing tactic of mass arrests.
Even in the context of a warrantless arrest, courts still recognize that police need probable cause that a crime has been or is being
committed to justify the arrest.58 Probable cause is a complete defense to an unlawful arrest claim.59
There is probable cause when the court finds that a reasonable
person, i.e., the police officer, would believe that any crime had been
committed or was being committed.60 Courts assess the existence of
probable cause not by any bright-line test, but by assessing the totality of the circumstances.61 To be sure, there is plenty to criticize
about applying the probable cause standard in the course of a single
arrest. Probable cause is a low standard that a police officer can
easily satisfy for an individual arrest.62
57. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 325, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, [they] may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the
offender.”); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“A warrantless arrest
of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s
presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable
cause.”); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(“Atwater . . . recognized no constitutional limitation on arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor
offense.”); Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding
arrest where penalty was “a fine plus the costs of prosecution”); see also Vargas v. City
of New York, 56 N.Y.S.3d 438, 440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (upholding a warrantless arrest
when sentenced to four days of community service and a $120 surcharge).
58. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
59. Meyers v. City of New York, 812 F. App’x *11, *14 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Probable cause
is a complete defense to a constitutional claim of false arrest”); accord Garcia v. Bloomberg,
662 F. App’x *50, *52 (2d Cir. 2016); Dukore v. District of Columbia, 799 F.3d 1137, 1142
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2014); Oberwetter v.
Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090,
1092–94 (7th Cir. 1995).
60. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (“The quantum of information which constitutes probable cause [is] evidence which would ‘warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief’ that a felony has been committed.” (citation omitted));
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (“In dealing with probable cause,
however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”).
61. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
230–31 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981).
62. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175. While a full critique of probable cause is beyond the
scope of this Essay, other scholars have evaluated the problems with the fluid standard.
See Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification
Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1515 (2010) (“In increasingly common situations,
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Furthermore, courts look generously upon police officer actions
the actions in the field where—from the judiciary’s perspectives—
circumstances are almost always “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving . . . .”63 In addition, courts do not consider in their probable cause
analysis whether a police officer has malicious intent or is using
their arrest power pretextually.64 A police officer’s subjective intent
is irrelevant in the court’s assessment of the legality of the arrest.65
Despite the many shortcomings of the probable cause standard,
matters are worse for protesters swept up in mass arrests. In the
context of mass arrests, an increasing number of courts deviate from
a central tenet of probable cause—individualized suspicion. In Ybarra
v. Illinois, the Supreme Court denied the argument that police officers had probable cause to search Ventura Ybarra just because he
was present in a tavern where officers were executing an arrest
warrant.66 The Court stated:
A person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected
of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable
cause to search that person. Where the standard is probable cause,
a search or seizure . . . must be supported by probable cause
particularized with respect to that person.67

The Supreme Court thus rejected the government’s argument
that the police could reasonably believe that Mr. Ybarra was guilty
solely by association to a location or by his proximity to criminal suspects. The Court found this assertion inconsistent with Mr. Ybarra’s
whenever the police have any suspicion at all about a piece of evidence, they almost always
have probable cause and can meet the highest level of justification.); see also Cynthia Lee,
Probable Cause with Teeth, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 269 (2020); Erica Goldberg,
Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789,
790 (2013).
63. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989); see also Nieves v. Bartlett, 139
S. Ct. 1715, 1725 (2019) (“Police officers conduct approximately 29,000 arrests every day—a
dangerous task that requires making quick decisions in ‘circumstances that are tense,
uncertain and rapidly evolving.’ ” (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397)); Paff v. Kaltenbach,
204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d. Cir. 2000) (“While probable cause to arrest requires more than
mere suspicion, the law recognizes that probable cause determinations have to be made
‘on the spot’ under pressure and do ‘not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence
that a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance standard demands.’ ” (quoting Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975))).
64. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). As a matter of fact,
as long as there is probable cause for a crime, plaintiff’s claim of retaliatory arrest under
the First Amendment is defeated. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1726–27 (2019).
65. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1724–25.
66. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91–92 (1979).
67. Id. at 91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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reasonable expectation of privacy in his person.68 “Each patron . . .
was clothed with constitutional protection against unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. That individualized protection
was separate and distinct from the Fourth Amendment . . . protection possessed by [others] . . . .”69 Applying Ybarra to the context at
hand, courts are strip protesters of Fourth Amendment constitutional protection when they do not demand that the police have
individualized probable cause for every protester swept up in mass
arrests. This is the devastating consequence when courts adopt the
notion of what is best described as group or unit probable cause.
Group or unit probable cause reared its head in a 2009 protest
case, Carr v. District of Columbia.70 In that § 1983 class action lawsuit,
Washington D.C. police officers arrested sixty-five to seventy protesters, including the plaintiffs, in a demonstration against George
W. Bush’s presidency.71 Police reported following a group of about
250–300 protesters and effectuating the mass arrests, after seeing
a few people in the group engage in vandalism, as others cheered in
response.72 Plaintiffs contended that although they marched along
with the group, not everyone in the group cheered for individual acts
of vandalism.73 Some plaintiffs denied even seeing or knowing about
any of the reported vandalism, a reasonable contention given the
protest’s size.74
Plaintiffs argued—and the D.C. District Court agreed—that there
was no probable cause that each of them individually engaged in the
crime of rioting.75 D.C. Code § 22-1322(a) defines rioting as “a public
disturbance involving an assemblage of [five] or more persons which
by tumultuous and violent conduct or the threat thereof creates
grave danger of damage or injury to property or persons.”76 Thus,
the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ request for summary judgment.77 Citing Ybarra v. Illinois and the need for a particularized
finding of probable cause for each individual, District Judge Ellen
68. Id. at 91–92.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. See 587 F.3d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2009). I previously discussed the perils of unit
probable cause and the particular risks it poses to protesters of color. See Karen J. Pita
Loor, Tear Gas + Water Hoses + Dispersal Orders: The Fourth Amendment Endorses
Brutality in Protest Policing, 100 B.U. L. REV. 817, 830 (2020).
71. Carr, 587 F.3d at 403–04.
72. Id. at 403–04.
73. See id. at 404–05.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 405, 410.
76. See D.C. CODE § 22-1322(a) (2020) (alteration added); see also Carr, 587 F.3d at
405–06.
77. Carr v. D.C., 565 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Segal Huvelle concluded that “[t]o demonstrate that plaintiffs’ arrests
were valid . . . the District [of Columbia] must show that it had
probable cause to arrest each individual for rioting.”78 Judge Huvelle
found that generalized statements about the conduct of the crowd
were insufficient and that “[n]owhere does the [defendant municipality] ‘ma[ke] [any] effort to ascribe misdeeds to the specific individuals arrested.’”79 Tellingly, police officers were unable to identify
those who were involved in violence or vandalism or specifically
state whether any of the people arrested cheered such acts.80
However, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed Judge
Huvelle’s ruling granting summary judgment to plaintiff protestors,
finding instead that the protesters could have acted as a “cohesive
unit.”81 Regarding Judge Huvelle’s ruling about the necessity of probable cause for each arrested individual, the D.C. Circuit expressed
concern that “[a] requirement that the officers verify that each and
every member of a crowd engaged in specific riotous act would be
practically impossible in any situation involving a large riot.”82 This
finding expressly contradicts Ybarra v. Illinois, which does not require
that the municipality demonstrate there was probable cause for
everyone in the crowd, just for the people arrested.83 Here, the police
did not have to arrest a large mass of people, but could have just arrested those they observed engaged in vandalism had they bothered
to keep track of those they claimed were particularly dangerous.84
Although the D.C. Circuit worried that “appellees read the statute
so as to make it unenforceable in situations where it is most
needed,”85 in so doing, it effectively stripped every single protester
marching along of Fourth Amendment protection and began a trend
towards group or unit probable cause which has proved dangerous
for protesters swept up in mass arrests.
In his concurrence to the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Carr,
Circuit Judge Thomas B. Griffith stated, “[a]s Supreme Court precedent affirms, the Fourth Amendment requires an individualized
showing of probable cause before arrest[]” and warned that “[t]he
majority unnecessarily calls into question the heretofore straightforward application of that standard in this circuit.”86 Citing Ybarra v.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Carr, 587 F.3d at 407.
Id. at 408.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91–92 (1979).
See id.
Carr, 587 F.3d at 408.
Id. at 412 (Griffith, J., concurring). Judge Griffith still concurred with the reversal
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Illinois, Judge Griffith called out the majority for scrapping the
traditional individualized suspicion standard and creating a new, less
demanding standard of probable cause for mass demonstrations87—
which I term probable cause minus. Out of concern that it is “practically impossible” for a police officer to establish probable cause for
each arrestee, probable cause minus disposes with these individualized determinations in the context of large demonstrations if the
arrestee is one of a group where some activists are engaged in unlawful conduct.88 As Judge Griffith points out, “[t]he issue, however,
is not what is practical but what the Fourth Amendment requires, and
in this case the majority departs from the Supreme Court’s consistent instruction that individualized probable cause must precede
arrest.”89 Recognizing despite any reference to a cohesive unit, police
officers currently arrest persons without requiring “an individualized determination that the person arrested acted unlawfully[,]”
such that “a reasonable belief that a crowd acted ‘as a unit[]’ . . .
cannot be the basis for the arrest of a member of that crowd, unless
there is also a particularized showing that the person broke the
law.”90 Although the majority’s unit approach to probable cause was
clearly contrary to long-standing Fourth Amendment precedent, it
has not been confined to Carr. Instead, many other jurisdictions
have since adopted this probable cause minus approach standard to
justify mass arrests during protests.91
of the grant of summary judgment because he concluded that there remained a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether a reasonable jury could credit Officer Keller’s
testimony that he observed every person in the crowd committing a crime. Id. While Judge
Griffith recognized that “[t]he assertion that one officer could see each of the 300 individuals was audacious[,]” he stated that Judge Huvelle for the majority failed to view the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (as required by the rules governing
summary judgment) and that issues regarding Officer Keller’s credibility were the
providence of the jury. Id. Judge Griffith explained that such a narrow ruling tailored
to the facts of this case and focused on what the police officer claimed they could observe
among people in the crowd would serve to “correct[] the district court’s error without
suggesting police may conduct mass arrests without individualized probable cause.” Id.
87. Carr, 587 F.3d at 412–13.
88. See id. at 413.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding that “[i]t was reasonable, therefore, for an officer to believe that the group, as a
whole, was committing one or more offenses under state law, including . . . riot[ing] and
unlawful assembly”); White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1079 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that
police officers had probable cause to believe that individuals during the Ferguson protests
knew about the unlawful acts of others in the group and chose not to “disassociate”
themselves and thus their arrest for unlawful assembly was lawful); Garcia v. Does, 779
F.3d 84, 87, 92–96 (2d Cir. 2015) (reversing Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478,
489–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)) (rejecting the argument—made pursuant to Carr—that it was
reasonable for police officers to treat 700 Occupy protesters as a group and arrest them
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It is too early in the Black Lives Matter Los Angeles v. City of
Los Angeles lawsuit to know what approach the court will take to
evaluate the mass arrests.92 However, in their opposition to plaintiffs’ request for an injunction that would restrict the LAPD’s use of
force—including projectiles and baton strikes—and their use of
certain detention tactics, defendants sought to justify LAPD’s actions in circumstances of what they termed “mass unrest” by alluding
that “‘arrestees were part of a group . . . operating in an organized
and concerted effort to invade private property, obstruct business,
and hinder law enforcement.’”93 Defendants made this argument
despite their own recognition in the first page of the same opposition
brief that “[t]he recent mass demonstrations were largely peaceful.”94
Furthermore, while defendants asserted that there were “criminal
acts of arson and looting,” the City Council examination found that
the overwhelming majority of arrests were for curfew violations or
failure to follow a police order—contradicting defendants’ claims.95
Defendants knew this when they filed their opposition on June 30,
2020.96 On June 2, LAPD Chief Michel Moore, one of the named
defendants in the lawsuit, had informed the public that ninety-two
percent of arrests were for these two types of non-violent offenses.97
B. Roots of the Expressive Fourth Amendment
In a prior article, I introduced the Expressive Fourth Amendment
and explained its historical and doctrinal underpinnings. In this
Section, I will briefly review both foundations, providing just enough
background so the reader can generally understand the doctrine and
its application to mass arrests of protesters. For a fuller explication,
all even if only some of them heard the police warning to move or be arrested and dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint). But see Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 740–46
(7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the argument that defendants made in their brief pursuant to
Carr that police officers had probable cause to arrest about 900 marchers); Brief of
Defendants-Appellees Individual Defendant Officers at 18–19, Vodak v. City of Chicago,
639 F.3d 738 (Nos. 09-2768, 09-2834, 09-2901) (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2010), 2010 WL 4621548
(arguing the “crowd was infected with disorder”).
92. The plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in June 18, 2021. See
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19. The defendants have not filed a motion to
dismiss and none of the parties have filed a motion for summary judgment.
93. Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order
at 9, Black Lives Matter L.A. v. City of L.A. (No. 2:20-cv-05027) (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2020)
(quoting Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1994)).
94. Id. at 3.
95. L.A. CITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 18, at 10.
96. LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF POLICE, SAFE LA AFTER ACTION REPORT 44 (2020).
97. Cindy Von Quednow, More Than 92% of 2,700 Arrests in L.A. Were for “Failure
to Disperse” or Curfew Violations, KTLA5 (Jun. 2, 2020, 7:23 PM), https://ktla.com/news
/lapd-arrests-more-than-2700-people-amid-protests-chief [https://perma.cc/MR2P-7EN6].
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the reader may choose to peruse my prior piece, The Expressive
Fourth Amendment.98
Understanding the expressive component of Fourth Amendment protection in the context of protest is important because courts
make a mistake when using the same lens to evaluate a police
officer’s response to a protester as a police officer’s response to a
criminal suspect. Courts should not equate protest activity to either
suspected criminal activity or noncriminal non-expressive activity.
Protest activity is not only socially valuable, but it is expressive conduct that is intended to be protected by the Fourth Amendment—
not just the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has already
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects expression in the
context of searches of expressive materials or “papers”99 such as
books, magazines, and videos, that are potentially protected by the
First Amendment.100
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
seizures, including arrests, as well as against unreasonable
searches.101 Supreme Court precedent treats searches of papers differently than searches for non-expressive items, elevating the Fourth
Amendment inquiry from what is reasonable to what is reasonable
in light of freedom of expression.102 This means that the Court reviews the Fourth Amendment intrusion more stringently when a
government actor searches for papers than when the actor searches
for ordinary materials.103
The Court provides this heightened review in paper searches
because it recognizes that the Framers intended for the Fourth
Amendment—not just the First Amendment—to be a constitutional
vehicle that protects freedom of thought and expression, in addition
to bodily integrity and privacy in the context of criminal investigation.104 As Justice William Douglas asserted in his dissent to Frank
v. Maryland, it is misreading “history . . . [to] relate[] the Fourth
Amendment primarily to searches for evidence to be used in criminal
98. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6.
99. By papers, I am referring to materials recognized as expressive by the Court. In
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973), the Court found that “the prior restraint
of the right of expression, whether by books or films [or other expressive material], calls
for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness.” This standard thus applies to
all “paper cases” regardless of medium. See id.
100. See New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 873 (1986); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S.
463, 468 (1985); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 537, 564 (1978); Roaden v. Kentucky,
413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); Marcus v. Search
Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 730 (1961).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
102. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6 (quoting Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504).
103. Id.
104. See id.
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prosecutions. . . . [I]t was the search for the nonconformist that led
British officials to ransack private homes.”105 “The Fourth Amendment thus has a much wider frame of reference than mere criminal
prosecutions.”106
The history that Justice Douglas refers to—and that the Supreme Court has referenced again and again in these paper search
cases—is the story of a controversy in the mid-eighteenth century
between the English monarchy and the press.107 Despite these events
(and ensuing litigation) playing out on the other side of the Atlantic,
the quarrel received significant coverage in the colonial press and
shaped American thought on search and seizure, particularly the
understanding that—if unrestrained—the government can easily
use its search and seizure power to stifle expression.108
The story begins with the anonymous publication of an article
critical of King George III in the forty-fifth weekly edition of the antigovernment newspaper, The North Briton. The North Briton 45 vigorously criticized the King’s speech in support of the Treaty of Paris
of 1763, which ended the Seven Years’ War between Great Britain,
France and Spain.109 The issue condemned the treaty for ceding too
much to the French in the name of peace.110 In the view of some (including The North Briton 45’s author), the British Crown was surrendering the country’s fought for and rightfully earned spoils of
war.111 The British Attorney General and Solicitor General labeled
the forty-fifth edition libel, and thus began a search for anyone associated with its publication.112
105. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 377.
107. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6 (citing Frank, 359 U.S. at 376; Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 722–24
(1961)).
108. Id.
109. See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING
602–1791 440 (Oxford University Press, 2009); see also America Revolution Podcast:
Treaty of Paris and the Wilkes Affair (Oct. 29, 2017). The North Briton 45’s author began
criticizing the speech stating “The [King’s] speech of last Tuesday is not to paralleled in the
annals of our country.” John Wilkes, Issue No. 45, THE NORTH BRITON 263–64 (Apr. 23,
1763), https://archive.org/details/northbriton00wilkgoog/page/n270/mode/2up [https://
perma.cc/YG96-WTTW]. With regard to the agreements made by the Treaty of Paris, the
author declared “The preliminary articles of peace were such as have drawn the contempt
of mankind on our wretched negotiators.” Id.
110. See CASH, infra note 112, at 265.
111. See id. The North Briton 45’s authors critiqued the King’s actions as unbecoming
and unroyal bemoaning, stating “I wish as much as any man in the kingdom to see the
honor of the crown maintained in a manner truly becoming Royalty. I lament to see it
sunk even to prostitution.” See id. at 266–67.
112. See ARTHUR CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL LIBERTY 101
(Yale Univ. Press 2006).
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The instrument the British government used to execute these
searches was a general warrant, signed by the Secretary of State.113
The general warrant was essentially what its name suggests: general. It did not require specificity regarding the person or items to
be seized or the place to be searched or even a specific account of the
facts in support of the warrant.114 It was not confined to a specific
time period, but instead could last for as long as the monarch lived.115
This warrant required “in his Majesty’s name . . . to make strict &
diligent search for the Authors, Printers & Publishers of a seditious
and treasonable paper [e]ntitled, The North Briton Number 45 [sic]”
and take dissenters into custody and bring them before the Secretary of State for questioning and further legal proceedings.116 With
warrant in hand, the King’s messengers ransacked multiple homes,
collected voluminous papers, and, at the conclusion of the search
and seizure spree, arrested a total of forty-nine people.117 Those
arrested included not only individuals tangentially connected to the
newspaper (such as employees who did not work on the forty-fifth
edition), but also their family members.118
These arrests and searches resulted in about thirty lawsuits
against the executors of the warrants for charges such as unlawful
imprisonment and trespass.119 The British press, as well as the
Colonial press, covered these cases in detail—with the American press
usually reprinting the content of British newspapers.120 Press commentary was scathing of general warrants, referring to the instrument as “unconstitutional” and an affront to the “security [and
liberty] of every Englishman.”121 While the results of the lawsuits
varied in the courtroom, the reputation of general warrants was
marred in the court of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic.122
As the Supreme Court has recognized in its paper cases, the
memory of The North Briton 45 searches and arrests guided Framers as they drafted the Fourth Amendment.123 Therefore, the Court
has instructed that searches of expressive materials must be reviewed with “most scrupulous exactitude.”124 The Court has used this
113. See CUDDIHY, supra note 109, at 440; see also CASH, supra note 112, at 101.
114. CUDDIHY, supra note 109, at 441; CASH, supra note 112, at 101.
115. See CUDDIHY, supra note 109, at 440.
116. CASH, supra note 112, at 101.
117. CUDDIHY, supra note 109, at 441–43.
118. See id. at 441, 443.
119. Id. at 443.
120. See id. at 458.
121. Id. at 459.
122. See id. at 463.
123. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6 (citing Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367
U.S. 717, 722–24 (1961)).
124. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
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heightened review in searches for expressive materials of a political
and, interestingly, of a potentially obscene nature.125 In these searches,
the Court has reined in its usual deference to law enforcement out
of concern that such treatment would result in overbroad and expansive searches where officers sweep up potentially First Amendment protected materials.126 When the targets of the search are
expressive materials, the Court has found repugnant to the Fourth
Amendment procedures that rely on the “whim”127 of individual police
officers to determine what should be seized. Thus, the Court has
placed limits on police officer discretionary actions, recognizing that
even when the government has the power to police or actually prevent the distribution of these expressive materials that “does not
mean that there can be no constitutional barrier to any form of practical exercise of that power.”128 Justice William Brennan connected
the dots in his dissent to Maryland v. Macon from search to arrest and
asserted that the Court must also review more stringently a person’s
arrest for the distribution of expressive obscene materials.129 He
stated that “[a] warrantless arrest involves the same difficulties and
poses the same risks as does a warrantless seizure of books, magazines, or films.”130 “The disruptive potential [on the First Amendment]
of an effectively unbounded [Fourth Amendment] power to arrest
should be apparent.”131
C. The Expressive Fourth Amendment and Mass Arrests
The existence of Supreme Court precedent limiting judicial
deference to police officers when they search for expressive materials raises the question of why police enjoy such unbounded power to
arrest when engaging with people participating in expressive protest
activity. The answer is that they should not.
125. See, e.g., id. at 485–86 (involving the search for communist materials); Roaden v.
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504–05 (1973) (involving the seizure of an allegedly obscene film).
126. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6; see also Marcus, 367 U.S. at 733
(stating “procedures that sweep too broadly with too little discrimination are obviously
deficient in techniques required . . . to prevent erosion of constitutional guarantees”).
127. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485.
128. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 730 (quoting Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
129. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6 (citing Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S.
463, 473 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The majority in Maryland v. Macon did not
decide whether the warrantless arrest of the bookstore’s attendant, after an undercover
police officer purchased two magazines which he and two other officers judged as obscene, was unconstitutional. 472 U.S. at 471. Instead, the majority only focused on whether
the magazines that the undercover officer purchased were admissible at trial without
a warrant. Id. at 467–71.
130. Macon, 472 U.S. at 473–74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 474.
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In light of the Expressive Fourth Amendment, the Court must
limit police officers’ arrest power when their targets are people involved in expressive conduct. The current understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, which narrows its ambit of protection for intrusions on
the person only to bodily integrity in the context of criminal investigations, does violence to the First Amendment rights of activists
swept up indiscriminately swept up in mass arrests. Instead, courts
must recognize that the Fourth Amendment also protects freedom
of expression not just in the context of searches, but also in the
context of seizures of individuals. As Justice Brennan predicted, the
disruption to the First Amendment is clear when considering the
accounts of mass arrests of swaths of people in the Los Angeles
protests. To comport with the Expressive Fourth Amendment, courts
must shift the question when an arrestee is involved in expressive
activity and ask whether a police officer’s action is “reasonable in
light of freedom of expression.”132 In the context of mass arrests, courts
must begin by discarding notions of group/unit probable cause. Second,
when evaluating the existence of probable cause for arrest, courts
must positively weigh an individual’s expressive protest activity in
the totality of the circumstances. Both considerations are briefly
outlined below.
1. Group/Unit Probable Cause
Courts must review with scrupulous exactitude arrests of individuals engaged in protest. This heightened review provides no room
for shortcuts that cast a shadow of probable cause over one protestor
because of the unlawful or aggressive conduct of others in close
proximity. The prevailing probable cause minus standard is inconsistent with the Expressive Fourth Amendment which requires
stringent review. Just like the Court has been rightfully concerned
over the expansive and overbroad searches that gather potentially
protected expressive items,133 so should the Court be concerned
about expansive and overbroad arrests—based on a deficient probable cause minus standard—that result in the stifling seizure of
individuals engaged in protected protest activity.
In the Black Lives Matter Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles
lawsuit, there were multiple accounts of people engaged in protest
132. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6 (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496, 504 (1973) (emphasis added)); see also supra Section II.B for discussion of “in light
of freedom of expression.”
133. See supra Section II.B for discussion of expansive and overbroad searches of
potentially protected expressive (obscene) items.
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activity who were corralled and arrested by the hundreds.134 While
some of the arrestees may have been involved in unlawful activity,
police must be able to articulate facts supporting probable cause for
each individual arrested. It does not satisfy the Expressive Fourth
Amendment to assert that police had probable cause to arrest the
unit or group or, as the City of Los Angeles and the other defendants argued, that “arrestees were part of a group . . . operating in
an organized and concerted effort to invade private property, obstruct business, and hinder law enforcement.”135 “Police don’t arrest
[groups or] units. They arrest persons[.]”136 The unit probable cause
approach provides too much deference and leeway to the whims of
police who in their zeal to restore order trample—either carelessly
or willfully—on activists’ rights.137 Although much greater in terms
of numbers, these mass arrests of racial justice protesters are reminiscent, in their indiscriminate and rash nature, of the forty-nine
arrests made in connection with The Briton 45 search and seizure
spree. This is the very practice against which the Framers sought
to protect. “[T]he experience of . . . mass arrests was at the forefront” of those who drafted the Fourth Amendment with the goal of
protecting against such seizures.138
2. Expressive Conduct Under the Totality of the
Circumstances
Courts determine whether a police officer had probable cause to
arrest an individual by looking at the totality of the circumstances.139
Again, this means that there is no bright line test as probable cause
is a fluid concept, but rather the judge must evaluate the whole picture to assess the reasonableness of the police officer’s action.140 When
the question is shifted to what is reasonable in light of freedom of
expression, courts’ evaluation of the whole picture must include
134. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 7, 11–14, 24, 26, 28, 30.
135. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 9, Black
Lives Matter L.A. v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:20-cv-05027 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2021)
(quoting Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1994)).
136. Carr v. D.C., 587 F.3d 401, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Griffith, J., concurring).
137. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 474 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing concern over a police officer making their own determination about probable
cause to arrest for distribution of obscenity since “the situation poses the same risk that
the officer’s zeal to enforce the law will lead to erroneous judgments with respect to the
obscenity of material that is constitutionally protected.”).
138. CUDDIHY, supra note 109, at 613.
139. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230
(1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
140. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9; Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–31; Cortez, 449 U.S. at
417–18.

26

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 28:005

consideration of an individual’s engagement in expressive protest
activity. Fourth Amendment questions are questions of balancing.141
When the government actor strikes the right balance between the
intrusion on the individual—be it a search or a seizure—and the
governmental interest at stake, the action is a reasonable one.142
The balance is off when courts ignore an individual’s engagement in
expressive protest activity in the reasonableness calculus.143
To begin with, in the context of protest, the police action intrudes
not only on a person’s bodily integrity as is the case for arrests in
the regular course of criminal investigations, but also on a person’s
freedom of expression rights against which the Expressive Fourth
protects. Even more, protest activity is theoretically revered in our
American democracy. As Justice Louis Brandeis eloquently stated:
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that, without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile . . . that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.144

Considering the centrality of freedom of expression in our system, the
government also has an interest in facilitating protest activity—
while it has no comparable interest in facilitating a criminal suspect’s
activities. This translates to a concomitant duty for police officers to
protect freedom of expression, in addition to their traditional duty
to maintain public safety.145
Furthermore, courts’ heightened concerns about police officer
safety should not be present when they interact with protesters in the
same manner as when police interact with a criminal suspect. Courts
defer to law enforcement, at least in part, because they consider policing a dangerous job. This is because courts consider people involved in criminal activity dangerous to police.146 However, this
141. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
142. See id. (“[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged
by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989).
143. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6.
144. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled
by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
145. See Loor, Expressive Fourth, supra note 6.
146. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (considering “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471
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preoccupation with the well-being of police officers should not continue when people policed are protesters, and not people suspected
of other alleged criminal activity.147 As a matter of fact, research suggests that it is law enforcement violence that turns peaceful protests
violent.148 It is police who are escalating violence during protests—
not protesters.149
Thus, when assessing whether police conduct was reasonable in
light of freedom of expression, the balance must include and positively weigh an individual’s expressive political conduct. When a law
enforcement officer stops protest activity via arrest, they not only
intrude on an individual’s right to bodily integrity, but also on the
individual’s right to free expression. Furthermore, police also infringe on the government’s own interest in the vigorous exchange of
ideas that fuel our democracy. Courts must rein in the wide latitude
typically afforded to police officers on the streets when considering
the resulting threats to constitutionally protected protest activity.
CONCLUSION
Courts have consistently ignored the expressive component of
Fourth Amendment protections when evaluating mass arrests of
protesters. Judges have likewise failed to consider whether the fact
that individuals are engaged first and foremost in First Amendment
expressive conduct alters the reasonableness balancing. The Expressive Fourth Amendment mandates that government intrusions on
expressive protest activity receive more discerning judicial review.

U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses
a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”).
147. For instance, PolitiFact researched and found to be false a claim from a June 8,
2020, The New York Post article that claimed that 1,000 police officers were injured
nationwide in the George Floyd protests. Tom Kertscher, No Proof that Black Lives
Matter Killed 36 People, Injured 1,000 Police Officers, POLITIFACT (Aug. 7, 2020), https://
www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/aug/07/facebook-posts/no-proof-black-lives-matter
-killed-36-people-injur/#sources [https://perma.cc/3LVT-MHSK].
148. Maggie Koerth & Jamiles Lartey, Why So Many Police are Handling the Protests
Wrong, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 1, 2020, 2:55 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org
/2020/06/01/why-so-many-police-are-handling-the-protests-wrong [https://perma.cc
/K4DD-3L9U].
149. Id.

